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Abstract 
Complicity marks out a way that one person can be liable to 
sanctions for the wrongful conduct of another. After describing the 
concept and role of complicity in the law, I argue that much of the 
motivation for presenting complicity as a separate basis of criminal 
liability is misplaced; paradigmatic cases of complicity can be 
assimilated into standard causation-based accounts of criminal liability. 
But unlike others who make this sort of claim I argue that there is still 
room for genuine complicity in the law and in morality. In defending 
this claim, I sketch an approach to complicity which grounds our 
liability for what others do not in our causal relation to their actions 
but in our “agency-relations” with others. In such cases, one agent can 
be liable for the wrongs of second agent to the extent that first 
authorizes the second to act at her behest. This approach fills the gap 
where standard causation-based accounts of complicity fail – especially 
in where several agents cooperatively contribute to an overdetermined 
harm.   
 
1. Introduction 
Complicity marks out a way that one person can be liable to sanctions for 
the wrongful conduct of another. There are at least three approaches to an 
analysis of complicity. The first is a juristic; it adverts to the theoretical 
grounds for complicity in the law. The second is a joint-action approach 
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which grounds complicity in the shared actions and intentions of individuals 
engaged in a cooperative project. The third is a group-agency approach 
which locates complicity in the individuals who together compose a group 
agent. A comprehensive analysis of complicity would incorporate the insights 
of all three approaches into a univocal account. But that project is beyond 
the scope of this essay. Instead, I will focus mostly on the juristic approach, 
as it provides the most developed account of complicity. After describing the 
role of complicity in the law, I will argue that much of the motivation for 
presenting complicity as a separate basis of criminal liability is misplaced; 
paradigmatic cases of complicity can be assimilated into standard causation-
based accounts of criminal liability. But unlike others who make this sort of 
claim (Moore 2007) I will also argue that there is still room for genuine 
complicity in the law and in morality. In defending this claim, I sketch an 
approach to complicity which grounds our liability for what others do not in 
our causal relation to their actions but in our “agency-relations” with others.  
 
2. What Complicity Is  
In Anglo-American criminal law an individual can become liable for a crime 
by committing it herself. Doing so requires both performing the prohibited 
act (the actus reus) and harboring a culpable state of mind (the mens rea). 
However, the doctrine of complicity (also known as the law of aiding and 
abetting, or accessorial liability) states that individual (known as the 
secondary actor, the accomplice, or the accessory) can be liable for the crimes 
of someone else: the individual (known as the primary actor, or the principal) 
who actually committed the crime. In such cases the secondary becomes 
complicit by intentionally aiding or encouraging the primary to perform the 
prohibited act.1 Complicity, then, is not a crime in its own right. One cannot 
                                                          
1 In the UK, this doctrine is stated in the “Accessories and Abettors Act of 1861” 
(amended by the Criminal Law Act of 1977): ‘Whosoever shall aid, abet, counsel, or 
procure the commission of any indictable offence… shall be liable to be tried, indicted 
and punished as a principal off ender’. In the US the doctrine is stated in the Model 
Penal Code §2.06, and in the federal aiding and abetting statute: ‘[w]hoever commits 
an offense against the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or 
procures its commission, is punishable as a principal 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (1982). 
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be guilty of “complicity”(unlike the crime of “conspiracy”). Rather, complicity 
is a way to become liable for a crime committed by another. Once the 
complicity of the secondary is proved, then unless she is an accessory after 
the fact, she is as treated as if she had fulfilled the actus reus and mens rea 
conditions of the crime itself. In that respect she is treated like the primary. 
Crucially, however, the secondary’s liability is derivative rather than 
vicarious vis-à-vis the primary. In cases of vicarious liability, the defendant 
has committed no wrong; she is still (vicariously) liable for what the primary 
does in virtue of the defendant’s formal relationship with the primary (such 
as the relationship between a parent and child or between a commanding 
officer and her subordinates). This relationship permits attributing to the 
defendant responsibility for the wrongful actions the primary commits. 
When, alternatively, an individual is derivatively liable, her liability is 
parasitic off the primary’s liability in virtue of her own intentional actions — 
specifically actions aimed at contributing to the primary’s wrongful conduct. 
It is in virtue of so culpably contributing that she shares in the primary’s 
liability. 
 
2. Requisites of Complicity 
Under the law, for an individual to be complicit in the criminal wrongdoing 
of another, the secondary must not only contribute to the wrongful conduct 
of the primary, but do so with some mens rea directed towards the primary’s 
crime. It is generally acknowledged that accomplices need not have an 
intention with the same content as the primary. That would rule out the 
possibility of complicity altogether since a secondary intentionally performs 
acts of assistance or encouragement, not the prohibited act itself. But there is 
no further consensus over what the requisite mental state is. Some have 
argued that the secondary must provide aid with the purpose that the crime 
in question succeed (Judge Learned Hand in United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 
401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938)). This is despite the fact that many crimes do not 
require the mental state of purpose on the part of the primary. Others argue 
that mere knowledge of the fact that acting will enable the primary to 
commit the crime in question suffices for satisfying the mens rea (Weiss 
2002: 1396–1409). Still others abandon the notion that there is a single mens 
rea that the secondary must possess, in favor of the more flexible view that 
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the requisite mens rea for complicity varies with the mens rea required for 
the crime in question (Weiss 2002: 1410–14).  
It might seem useful to repair to the literature on joint action since it tends 
to meticulously detail the mental states that cooperators must have in order 
to qualify as joint actors. Since cooperative action in furtherance of 
wrongdoing seems to imply complicity, the mental states partly defi nitive of 
joint action might help resolve the requisite mens rea for complicity in the 
law. But this strategy cannot ground the existing law of complicity. This is 
because in the law, the secondary can be complicitously liable for having 
provided assistance in furtherance of the primary’s criminal act, even if the 
primary was unaware that she had been aided, as in this case: 
Guardian Devil 
J witnesses, without being noticed, a bank robbery in progress. J sees 
a patrol car approaching the scene. She wants the robbery to succeed 
(since she has a grudge against the bank). So J pretends to require 
assistance, thereby preventing the police from discovering the 
robbery. The robbery consequently succeeds. 
Under the doctrine of liability in Anglo-American law, the conditions for 
complicitous liability are satisfied so long as influence succeeds as intended in 
contributing to the decision of the principal to commit the crime. 
Accordingly, J is complicit in the robbers’ wrongdoing in that she can be 
charged as an accessory. But even on the most minimalist account of joint 
action (see for example Ludwig (2007)) the robber does not count as acting 
jointly with J since the robber has no intentions directed toward an action by 
a group that includes himself and J. Complicity in the law overflows joint 
action, in that it is possible to be complicit for a crime without partaking in 
a jointly intentional conduct. We cannot, then, simply turn to the literature 
on joint-action in an eff ort to ground complicity (though, as I will argue, the 
philosophy of joint action will have an important role to play in making 
sense of the agency-relation approach to liability). 
In what follows I focus on an issue that will inform the remainder of the 
discussion. If satisfying the actus reus of complicity requires a causal 
contribution to the wrong in question, what need is there for an account of 
complicity at all? 
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4. Superfluity of Complicity 
In standard cases of liability where the wrongdoer acts on her own and 
without assistance from others, she is liable in virtue of culpably causing the 
wrongful event in question (liability for omissions and inchoate crimes 
notwithstanding). In such cases, the liability is “direct” or “non-derivative” in 
that we need only appeal to the fact that the wrongdoer has culpably caused 
the wrongful event in order to explain her liability. But it is alleged — 
famously by Sanford Kadish, (1985) following Hart and Honoré (1958) — 
that we cannot appeal to direct liability in cases where one party contributes 
to a wrong via another’s voluntary acts. Where the primary’s actions are 
fully voluntary, the secondary cannot be characterized as having caused the 
primary’s actions. On this agent-causal view of human agency, the voluntary 
actions of agents are literally uncaused events. Accordingly, the secondary 
cannot be held liable for the crime on the basis that she caused it. The role 
of complicity, then, is to provide separate  grounds for liability in such cases.  
A doctrine ruling out interpersonal causation seems to render otiose 
contributory action – a requisite for the actus reus in complicity. But Kadish, 
again following Hart and Honoré, distinguishes between causation properly 
construed and mere causal influence. A “causal influence” simply raises the 
probability of an event’s occurrence, whereas a “cause” necessitates that 
event’s occurrence. Thus, Kadish writes that voluntary human actions can 
only be causally influenced, rather than outright caused: ‘Since an individual 
could always have chosen to act without the influence, it is always possible 
that he might have’ (Kadish 1985: 360). 
The disjunctive structure of liability – derivative versus direct – is necessary, 
then, to accommodate the liability of aiders and abettors given an agent-
causal view of autonomous agency. But agent-causation is an untenable view 
of metaphysics, at odds with a naturalistic view of the world. It claims that 
the will when operating freely does so in a realm distinct from that of 
ordinary natural events and laws, thereby insulating autonomous agents from 
the causal effects. It is hard to square this with a view that identifies willing 
with mental states that supervene on the neurological structure of our brains. 
While it might be true that we ineluctably tend to regard the voluntary 
actions of others as uncaused events, any account of morality ought to be 
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based not on our debunked pretheoretic intuitions about metaphysics, but on 
the most plausibly developed account of how things actually are.2 
Once we jettison the metaphysical baggage of agent-causation, we are in a 
position to see that the criminal law is not as dependent on a distinct 
doctrine of complicity as it might otherwise seem. Consider the following pair 
of examples. 
Uncertain Murder 1 
I want my innocent enemy dead. I have a friend — you — who might 
aid me in my goal. I ask you to kill him. I calculate that there is a 60 
percent chance that you’ll do so. You subsequently commit the 
murder. 
Uncertain Murder 2 
I want my innocent enemy dead. I constructed a machine which, if it 
functions correctly, will kill my enemy. The machine is not perfectly 
reliable though; it works only 60 percent of the time. The machine 
nonetheless successfully kills my enemy. 
The basis of liability in the two versions of the example should be exactly the 
same. The fact that my contribution to the innocent’s death in Uncertain 
Murder 1 is mediated by an agent, whereas in Uncertain Murder 2 it is not, 
makes no difference to my liability. In both cases, the basis of my liability is 
direct (or, alternatively put, non-derivative) in that I culpably act in a way 
that causes the innocent’s death. It just so happens that in the first case my 
causal relation to the death is mediated by an autonomous agent whereas in 
the second case it is not. 
The basis of an individual’s liability for a harm is the same regardless of 
whether she causes the harm by a) committing it, or b) aiding and abetting a 
voluntary accomplice. In both cases the individual is directly/non-
derivatively liable in that it is her causal relation to the wrong (rather than 
merely to the agent who commits it) that grounds her liability. The notion of 
complicity does no work in undergirding her liability. 
                                                          
2 For a compelling series of arguments in support of this view, see Moore (2000). 
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One might raise the following objection. For some acts, what the agent 
brings about precludes certain kinds of mediating agency. That is, some acts 
cannot “go through” the agency of others — at least not in certain ways. 
Sanford Kadish famously called these actions “nonproxyable” (Kadish 1985: 
372–85). A paradigm example of a nonproxyable act is rape. It is possible to 
contribute to the commission of a rape (by, for example, providing the 
perpetrator with access to the victim) but the contributor does not thereby 
commit the rape, regardless of how integral the contribution was. ‘In such 
cases’, John Gardner writes, ‘whoever acts through a principal must be an 
accomplice’ (Gardner 2007: 135). The upshot is that any attempt to subsume 
complicity under causation by recasting accomplices as non-derivatively 
liable for what the principal does must fail – at least for nonproxyable 
wrongs. 
But this objection fails. It is true that if, for example, P1 pays P2 to lie, 
which P2 consequently does, it is a semantic fact that only P2 committed the 
lie — not P1. But our interest is not in whether P2 can be felicitously 
described as having lied. Rather, our concern is with morality. What P1 
does, by intentionally contributing to the act of lying, is morally tantamount 
to what P2 does, precisely because P1 acted in a way to bring about a lie. 
The point can be put differently: there is no substantial moral difference 
between intentionally committing a nonproxyable wrong and intentionally 
causing that wrong to be brought about.3 It is thus a mistake to think that 
the only way to ground the liability of contributors of nonproxyable acts is 
by introducing derivative forms of liability. 
We might deny that causal contributors act as wrongly as proximate 
wrongdoers. But there are ways to accommodate this view without having to 
deny that the contributor is non-derivatively liable. For instance, when P1 
commits his act – i.e. when he pays P2 to lie – the probability that this will 
result in a lie is less than when P2 commits her act – i.e., when she utters the 
lie. If the probability that an act will result in a wrongdoing is relevant to 
the assessment of the wrongfulness of that act, then ceteris paribus P1 acts 
                                                          
3 For a far more thoroughgoing analysis of nonproxyability friendly to the sort of 
suggestion I’m making here, see Moore (2007) and Moore (2009). But see Yaffe 
(2012). 
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less wrongfully than P2. In addition, if the nonproxyable wrong is something 
particularly gruesome or heinous such as torture or rape, we might be 
inclined to think that the proximate wrongdoer is a morally worse person 
than an upstream contributor. But this is because performing these heinous 
crimes while actually facing the victim requires vicious character traits which 
the proximate wrongdoer, by virtue of committing the act, reveals himself to 
possess, whereas we cannot safely attribute these traits to the upstream 
contributor.  
So again, in the sorts of cases described so far, the contributor’s causal 
relation to the wrong (rather than merely to the agent who commits it) 
grounds her liability. We do not need to invoke the notion of complicity as a 
form of derivative liability to ground a causal contributor’s liability. 
If what I have argued is correct, many paradigmatic instances of complicity, 
construed as derivative liability, will fall under the rubric of causal liability. 
Suppose P2 wants to commit an armed robbery, but she lacks a fi rearm. P2 
asks P1 for a weapon; she agrees to give him a quarter of the loot in 
compensation. P1 agrees. On the orthodox account of complicity, P1 is liable 
for armed robbery even though she didn’t commit it; her liability in this case 
is derivative, where derivative liability is grounded in an attempt to enable 
the wrongdoer to commit a wrong. It is also the case, on the account I have 
presented, that P1 is liable for armed robbery even though she didn’t commit 
it – but her liability on my view is nonderivative. Like the protagonist in 
Uncertain Murder 1 and 2, she bears it wholly in virtue of the fact that she 
culpably acted in a way that risked causing an armed robbery. The fact that 
it was mediated by the agency of another does not itself change the basis of 
her liability. 
If the liability in such cases is non-derivative is there any room for complicity 
construed as a form of genuinely derivative liability? I will argue that there 
is.  
 
4. Superfluity of Complicity 
On both the orthodox account of complicity and the revised account, which 
dispenses with derivative liability, an individual is complicit in the 
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wrongdoing of another only if she causally contributes to that wrongdoing or 
causally influences the wrongdoer. The problem, though, is that it’s possible 
to causally contribute to a wrongdoing without making a morally relevant 
difference to that wrongdoing. To see why, it’s necessary to look closer at 
what it means to causally contribute to an event. 
The two dominant theories of causation today are regularity and 
counterfactual accounts. Regularity accounts explicate the notion of causal 
necessity undergirding accounts according to which one event is a cause of 
another event when the first event is an insufficient but necessary element of 
a set of conditions actually sufficient but not necessary for the occurrence of 
the second event.4 On counterfactual accounts, the first event is a cause of 
the second other if the two can be related to each other, either directly or by 
a chain of mediating events, such that if the first had not occurred, the 
second would not have occurred.5 There are, of course, numerous problems 
plaguing both accounts. But the problem of preemptive overdetermination in 
particular reveals the role that complicity plays in morality.6 Here is a 
typical example. 
Assassination Fund 
A villain wishes to assassinate a political figure meddlesome to local 
criminal elements. With the expressed purpose of doing so, the 
villain solicits financial donations from various criminals in 
furtherance of hiring a hitman. Hundreds of small donations pour in. 
The donations she receives are far more than what is necessary to 
hire a hitman, which she subsequently does. No one donation was 
necessary or sufficient for hiring the hitman. 
This sort of case is troublesome for any account of liability grounding an 
accomplice’s liability in her contribution to the wrongful act. Though each 
donor contributed to the fund, no particular contribution was a necessary 
                                                          
4 For variations of this account, see Hart and Honoré (1958), Mackie (1974), Wright 
(2001). 
5 The modern progenitor of such accounts is David Lewis. See Lewis (1973). 
6 For a detailed analysis, see Moore (2009). 
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element of a set of funds sufficient for hiring the assassin. We have difficulty, 
then, explaining why any donor is liable for a murder when no single donor 
caused that murder. An appeal to the supposedly “derivative” character of 
complicity is of no help, since we still need to explain why a contributor can 
be derivatively liable for a wrong that she did not empower the principal to 
commit. For any particular donor, she alone makes literally no difference to 
whether the murder occurs. It might be argued that she slightly raised the 
antecedent probability of the murder’s occurrence by donating, but it is 
unclear why this should make her liable for the murder when it turns out 
that her donation made no actual difference to the murder’s occurrence. We 
can imagine her donation lying at the bottom of the barrel, unused — yet she 
is liable for murder.  
Some have attempted to circumvent this problem by foregoing causal 
accounts of derivative liability altogether. For example, Christopher Kutz 
denies that a causal contribution is necessary for complicity; the 
“participatory intentions” of the accomplice are what grounds liability (Kutz 
2000). Michael S. Moore defends a singularist account of causation, which 
purports to solve problematic cases of overdetermination (2009: 496–512). 
(He also argues that subjective chance-raising can be a determiner of 
culpability). Sanford Kadish suggests that by ‘extending our wills’ to the 
actions of others we come to be complicit in what they do (1985: 355). Daniel 
Yeager, taking a different approach, argues that there is a morally relevant 
distinction between helping and doing ; complicitous individuals, by merely 
helping, incur a risk-based rather than a harm-based form of liability (Yeager 
1996). 
I believe Kutz and Kadish are on the right track. When we intentionally 
cooperate in furtherance of some collectively caused event, each cooperator 
can become liable for what any other cooperator does, in virtue of making 
herself the principal’s agent. That is, when someone agrees to act at your 
behest in furtherance of some goal you specify, you can become liable for 
what that person foreseeably does in furtherance of that goal independent of 
whether you caused (or even causally influenced) your agent to so act. 
Consider this case:  
Yard Cleaning 
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P1, who is physically disabled, asks P2 for a favor: that P2 clean 
P1’s front yard. While on an errand, P2 happens to be driving by 
P1’s house — though she doesn’t know that this house is P1’s. 
Detesting the sight of an unsightly front yard, P2 takes it upon 
herself to clean it, not knowing that she is cleaning P1’s yard. In the 
process of doing so, P2 recklessly damages prized orchids belonging 
to P1’s neighbors. 
P1 bears remedial liability for the damages that P2 causes even though P1’s 
agreement with P2 in no sense contributed to P2’s conduct. Of course, if it 
weren’t for P1, P2 wouldn’t have caused the damage since P2 was, after all, 
cleaning P1’s yard. But this alone does not ground P1’s liability — after all, if 
P2’s assistance were unsolicited, then P1 would not be remedially liable even 
though she is a sine qua non of the damage P2 causes. What grounds P1’s 
remedial liability, then, is not her causal or counterfactual relation to what 
P2 does, but the fact that she intentionally made P2 her agent. It is the 
normative rather than the causal relationship P1 bears to P2 that makes P1 
liable for what P2 foreseeably does in furtherance of the ends specified in 
that relationship. P1 vests in P2 the fiduciary power to act on P1’s behalf; 
this fiduciary power is insensitive to the causal route by which P2 comes to 
subsequently act, so long as those actions fall within the rubric of the 
proffered agreement. 
Successful uptake of the agency-relation requires that P2 see herself as 
having accepted P1’s request to act as an agent. But the satisfaction-
conditions for acting as someone’s agent are extensional in the sense that P2 
needn’t occurrently regard herself as P1’s (or anyone’s) agent when P2 is 
fulfilling her duties to P1. Rather, she need only act in a way that achieves 
what is required of her. This might seem to problematically ambiguate 
liability in cases where multiple principals establish agency-relations with one 
and the same individual who ultimately acts in ways that extensionally 
fulfills several of the roles she agreed to adopt.7 If in the course of doing so 
she acts recklessly, it might seem unclear which if any of the principals bears 
liability if we cannot repair to the agent’s intentions — specifically, those 
occurrent intentions specifying for whom she saw herself as acting. But there 
                                                          
7 I thank a referee for challenging me on this point. 
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is another option: the intentions the agent would have possessed upon 
careful, informed reflection specify the principal for whom she is acting in 
cases where there are multiple principals. If there is no mere single principal 
she settles on, this suggests that they share liability among them.  
So though in Yard Cleaning it is not the agreement that causes P2 to 
damage the orchids but rather a deviant causal chain, and though P2 did not 
take herself to be acting under the aegis of P1’s authority when the former 
was cleaning the latter’s yard, P1 is nonetheless liable. This is a non-causal, 
derivative basis of liability. It is not vicarious liability, since it is grounded in 
an agreement made between P1 and P2 — an agreement establishing what is 
called an “agency-relationship.” 
We have, then, a way to ground complicity in cases where the accomplice 
does not causally contribute to what the primary wrongdoer does. Recall that 
in Assassination Fund each donator, by virtue of donating with the intention 
of enabling the villain to fund the assassination thereby makes the villain his 
or her agent; this, in turn, makes each donator liable for what the villain 
does in foreseeable furtherance of carrying out the assassination. Because the 
villain hires the hitman in furtherance of the assassination, and because this 
was the expressed purpose of the fund, the donors are liable for the 
assassination. 
To better understand the nature of the agency-relation between the donors 
and the villain, it is helpful to strip the example of its inessential elements. 
Suppose the villain simply announces to the criminal underworld that if she 
receives enough donations, she will hire an assassin. That is the extent of the 
relationship between the villain and the donors. It seems, then, that the 
villain is not acting at the behest of the donors in that she does not seem to 
be acting as their representative or under their authority. In short, there 
seems to be no “agency-relation” between the villain and the donors. But this 
is illusory. If the villain presented her conditional intention to hire an 
assassin as a promise to the donors – a promise to hire an assassin should she 
receive enough funds – and, if the donors donated to the fund on the 
understanding that doing so is tantamount to accepting that promise, then 
the villain is thereby in an agency-relation with the donors. On this view, 
simply offering and accepting a promise establishes an agency-relation since 
the promisee now has a special authority over the promisor that the promisor 
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act in accordance with the terms of the mutually agreed-upon promise. This 
authority is asymmetrical: the promisee but not the promisor can at any time 
unilaterally free the promisor of the obligation the latter bears to the former. 
Some might balk at the suggestion that merely accepting a promise can be 
enough to establish an agency-relation. There is a high bar for entering into 
an agency-relation with others. It is typically thought to require an explicit 
agreement to that effect, and for good reason: because entering into an 
agency-relation with another has such sweeping effects on liability, the 
provisions for entering into such a relationship should be accordingly hard to 
satisfy. It might therefore seem that I am using the agency-relation (and with 
it, its normative upshots) over-inclusively. 
This is a potent objection, but I believe it can be defused. The agency-
relation is typically thought of as bivalent – you are either in such a relation 
or you are not. I propose that this is the wrong way to think about the 
agency-relation. It is best construed as a scalar relation in that there are 
degrees to which one is in an agency-relation with another. 
The stronger the agency-relation, the greater the deprivations to which the 
principal (P1) is liable for what the agent (P2) does, and the greater the 
range of actions committed by P2 for which P1 can be held liable. Put 
differently, the strength of the agency-relation affects the degree to which P1 
is liable for any given harm, and the harms for which P1 can be held liable. 
These factors can be respectively called the depth and the breadth of liability. 
I cannot here provide all the criteria determining the strength of the agency-
relation. But I will present a few viable candidates: 1) how each party 
characterizes their relationship to each other, 2) what is at stake in 
establishing the agency relation, and 3) the stringency of the agreement, all 
play a role in determining the strength of the agency-relation. I will briefly 
discuss these in order. 
In cases where the agency-relation is at its strongest, P2 not only agrees to 
be P1’s agent, but in addition, P1 is disposed to characterize herself as 
vesting a fiduciary power in P2; P2 likewise is disposed to characterize herself 
as acting on P1’s behalf. But it is possible to establish an agency-relation 
without either party thinking of her relation to the other in such terms. It is 
enough if P2 agrees to assist P1 in furthering some end that P1 has. In such 
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a case, P2 acts at the behest of P1, as P1’s agent; aft er all, if P2 
subsequently fails to act in accordance with the agreement absent good 
reason, P1 has a claim against P2. And only P1 can release P2 of the 
obligation that P2 has. It is not infelicitous, then, to describe P2 when she 
acts in accordance with that agreement (regardless of whether the agreement 
is what is motivating her to so act) as acting under P1’s authority. But the 
strength of the agency-relation established in such a case is weaker than in a 
case where each is disposed to characterize herself as in an agency-relation 
with the other. 
Another factor determining the strength of the agency-relation is this: the 
more at stake in establishing the agency-relation, the greater its strength. 
For example, agreeing to act as someone’s bodyguard will, simply by virtue 
of what is at stake in such a role, constitute a stronger agency-relation than 
agreeing to act as someone’s gardener. This suggests, in Yard Cleaning, that 
the strength of the agency-relation between P1 and P2 is relatively low. 
A final factor (in an incomplete list of factors) determining the strength of 
the agency-relation is the strength of the agreement between P1 and P2. 
Some agreements are stronger than others, where the strength determines 
among other things the stringency of the presumptive duty to follow through 
with the agreement. The strength of the agreement is determined by the 
reasonableness of the view that each party has a second-personal duty to 
follow through with the agreement. One factor determining the 
reasonableness of such a belief is whether and the extent to which the 
agreement is formalized. An agreement put in writing, assessed by a lawyer, 
and signed in the presence of a notary, will ceteris paribus be stronger than 
an agreement sealed by a wink and a nudge. Note, though, that as I 
indicated above, the agreement in question need not be one in which P2 
agrees to act as P1’s agent – an agreement in which P2 agrees to aid P1 in 
furtherance of some end will suffice to establish an agency-relationship, albeit 
a weaker one.  
With this preliminary and incomplete investigation of the factors influencing 
the strength of the agency-relation, we are now in a better position to assess 
the grounds for complicity in cases like Assassin Fund and Yard Cleaning. In 
the former case, it might seem that the donors made no agreement with the 
villain. But in soliciting financial assistance the villain is understood as 
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having agreed to use those funds in furtherance of hiring a hitman. Indeed, if 
he used it for completely different purposes the donors would have a claim 
against the villain precisely because the villain has broken his promise. This 
shows that we can interpret donating money under those circumstances as 
establishing a weak agency-relation between the villain and each donor. That 
the content of the agreement is largely implicit and informal, and that the 
villain might not see himself as an agent of the donors, weakens the agency-
relation established between them. But the fact that what is at stake is 
morally important – a matter of life or death – is a factor strengthening the 
agreement. (Determining how to weigh these against each other is a task for 
another time). 
Contrast this with Yard Cleaning. Again, the agreement between P1 and P2 
is not one in which P2 is expressly characterized as P1’s agent — this weakens 
the strength of the resulting agency-relation. But such a relation nonetheless 
exists in virtue of the agreement P2 makes to aid P1 in furtherance of 
cleaning P1’s yard. Since this end is morally trivial, the strength of the 
relation is accordingly diminished, which weakens the depth and breadth of 
P1’s liability for what P2 foreseeably does in furtherance of the ends specified 
in the agreement. Suppose, for example, that P2, instead of recklessly 
damaging the prized orchids belonging to P1’s neighbor, somehow ends up 
recklessly killing the neighbor’s child. P1 will bear little or no liability for 
what P2 does, not just because that eventuality was not relevantly 
foreseeable, but because the weak nature of the agency-relation accordingly 
narrows the breadth of P1’s liability – i.e. the range of acts committed by P2 
for which P1 is liable. 
 
4. Superfluity of Complicity 
Regardless of how an agency-account of complicity is developed, it will not 
do the work that complicity does in Anglo-American criminal or tort law; 
this is because in the law an individual can be complicit in a wrongdoing by 
contributing to it without the wrongdoer’s knowledge. Consider again 
Guardian Devil, where J aids robbers unbeknown to them. Since J assists 
without their knowledge, clearly there is no agency-relation between J and 
them. Yet in Anglo-American criminal law, J is legally complicit in their 
wrongdoing. J can be charged as an accessory to robbery. But I argued that 
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this is a straightforward case of non-derivative liability – it is J’s causal 
relation to the wrongdoing (in combination with satisfying the requisite 
culpable mental states) that grounds her liability. So, although this sort of 
case will not be covered by an account of complicity based in the agency-
relation, it does not need to do so. It is no limitation of the agency-relation 
account that it does not impute complicity in cases like Guardian Devil. 
There are many issues pertaining to derivative and non-derivative complicity 
which need much more discussion, such as the possibility of reckless 
derivative liability (whereby the agency-relation makes us complicit for 
wrongdoing we do not intend but are in a position to foresee); whether we 
can bear non-derivative liability for the unsuccessful attempts of wrongdoers 
we enable; whether an unsuccessful attempt to enable a wrongdoer who 
nonetheless succeeds can make the attempted enabler liable; whether we 
should treat non-derivative liability for the harm we enable another to 
commit differently from the non-derivative liability of innocent agency (i.e. 
cases where we use unwitting or cognitively impaired individuals in 
furtherance of wrongful ends), and so on. In addition, there is obviously 
much more to say about the determinants of the agency-relationship and its 
application, in a broader range of cases. But my goal here is more modest: to 
show that insofar as there is room for genuinely non-causal derivate liability 
– which seems necessary to implicate wrongdoers in cases of concurrent and 
preemptive overdetermination – we should take more seriously the possibility 
that the agency-relation can serve as grounds for complicity in such cases. 
 
sbazargan@ucsd.edu 
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